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THE THIRTEENTH JUROR: MEDIA
COVERAGE OF SUPERSIZED TRIALS
Mark J. Geragos
I. INTRODUCTION
I am a criminal defense attorney. That is almost all I have done
my entire adult life. My job is to zealously defend persons the
government accuses of committing crimes. As part of that process,
my job is also to ensure that my clients receive the fair trial, by an
impartial jury, guaranteed to them by the United States Constitution.'
In fact, I view the protection of this guarantee as more a calling
than a job. The constitutional entitlement to a fair and unbiased trial
and jury is an essential element of our Constitution's allocation of
power between government and its citizens and is, in my view,
fundamental to who we are as a nation. As I look back now, I can
see that my belief in the importance of this right in every criminal
case-no matter how unpopular or apparently guilty the defendant
might be-is what led me to become a defense attorney in the first
place.
At the same time, I am a legal commentator on television and I
treasure the constitutional guarantees of unrestricted speech and a
free press.2 These too, in my opinion, are essential components of a
free society which will have the backbone to support a criminal
defendant's right to a fair trial.
However, in recent years, while representing clients in many
high-profile criminal trials, I have become increasingly concerned
about the effect of the mass media on the ability of criminal
* Principal, Geragos & Geragos, P.C.; B.A. Haverford College, 1979; J.D.
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 1982. The author would like to thank Tina
Glandian of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for vital contributions to
this Article.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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defendants to obtain the fair trial they are constitutionally
guaranteed. I have experienced firsthand an insidious degradation of
the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and jury, created by a
commercially-motivated press capitalizing on the insatiable public
appetite for sensational criminal trials. My fear is that the right to a
fair trial has become subordinate to TV ratings and copy sales which,
in turn, reflect the public's voyeuristic obsession with real-life
courtroom soap operas.
In a time when reality television, myriad cable networks, and
supermarket tabloids regularly captivate millions, a high-profile case
involving "[m]urder and mystery, society, sex and suspense" 3 easily
becomes the subject of national engrossment. And so, as America
has "supersized" its food portions,4 it has also done so to those
courtroom dramas selected and inflated by the media. The
"supersize" nature of these cases is created by the media rather than
reflected by it, as journalists-invoking First Amendment protections
but abdicating social responsibility-capitalize on the public's
apparently insatiable appetite for all things sensational.
The result, from where I sit as a criminal defense attorney, is the
degradation of critical components of a defendant's right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury, not the least of which is the presumption of
innocence.
This Article explores the modern-day tension between saturation
media coverage and a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial and
jury, between the First Amendment's freedom of the press and the
Sixth Amendment's fair trial rights. These rights are not necessarily
incompatible. Indeed, media scrutiny of criminal proceedings can
help ensure their fairness. However, I question whether the media
has now gone too far under a cloak of First Amendment protection,
placing criminal defendants' constitutional rights at risk through
irresponsible journalism. The potential harm to such defendants is
unwarranted loss of liberty and, in some cases, even death. This
Article concludes that the tools traditionally employed by courts to
balance the rights of free press and fair trial are no longer effective
3. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356 (1966) (quoting State v.
Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Ohio 1956)).
4. See Alice Henneman, Sizing Up Food Portion Sizes, FOOD
REFLECTIONS, Oct. 2002, http://lancaster.unl.edu/food/ftoct02.htm.
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(if indeed they ever truly were). I propose a new solution that places
responsibility on the media while honoring its First Amendment
right.
This Article reveals that the existing techniques for minimizing
the impact of juror bias do not effectively protect the rights of
criminal defendants from the dangers posed by prejudicial publicity.
Although these judicial "remedies" were well intentioned when they
first came into use, they are outmoded-and actually quaint-in an
age of mass communications. Furthermore, with the increasing
discovery of "stealth jurors"5 in high-profile trials and the media's
ability to establish itself as a voice in the proceedings, these methods
have proven to be particularly ineffective when there is a high level
of prejudice against the defendant. Britain addressed the problem
with its Contempt of Court Act of 1981.6 The Act ultimately allows
courts to effectively curb the dissemination of prejudicial
information by the news media by authorizing civil or criminal
punishments against journalists who publish stories that present a
danger of compromising the fairness of a trial.7
Part II of this Article addresses the constitutional requirement of
fairness and impartiality in all criminal trials, and explains how
saturation coverage inflames the tension between free press and fair
trial rights. Part III explores the relationship between media
coverage, jury bias, and the presumption of innocence. Part IV
discusses the effects of pretrial publicity on jury selection and trial
fairness, contending that media manipulation distorts the facts and
taints the jury pool. Part V discusses the less-than-adequate judicial
responses to prejudicial publicity, namely the ineffectiveness of
change of venue and jury voir dire, and explains why these tools
have ceased to protect defendants' fair trial rights in high-profile
cases. Part VI of this Article proposes that the United States adopt a
system modeled after the British Contempt of Court Act of 1981 to
"elevate the Sixth Amendment from the second-class status it
5. Bennett L. Gershman, Contaminating the Verdict: The Problem of
Juror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REv. 322, 345 (2005) (defining stealth jurors as
those who secretly work their way onto a jury venire with the intent to convict
the defendant or for personal fame and wealth).
6. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c. 49 (Eng.).
7. Stephen J. Krause, Punishing the Press: Using Contempt of Court to
Secure the Right to a Fair Trial, 76 B.U. L. REv. 537, 538-39 (1996).
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currently occupies."
8
II. TRIAL FAIRNESS AND JURY IMPARTIALITY
A. The Requirement of an Impartial Jury
The Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed." 9  Furthermore, the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require fundamental fairness in
the prosecution of crimes and, therefore, support the requirement of
an impartial jury.'
0
Central to this right is the assurance that a jury's verdict will be
based only on evidence admitted at trial and will not be swayed by
outside influences." Chief Justice John Marshall explained that
"[t]he great value of the trial by jury certainly consists in its fairness
and impartiality. Those who most prize the institution, prize it
because it furnishes a tribunal which may be expected to be
uninfluenced by an undue bias of the mind."
' 12
B. How Saturation Coverage
Inflames the Tension Between Free Press and Fair Trial Rights
The problems generated by intense media coverage of criminal
trials "are almost as old as the Republic."'13  Time has only
exacerbated these problems. During my career alone, I have
8. Id. at 563.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
11. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692g).
12. Id.
13. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976). More
specifically, such conflicts can be traced as far back as Aaron Burr's treason
trial in 1807. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 50. At the time of Burr's trial, few
people in the area had not formed opinions about the case from newspaper
accounts and heightened public discussion. Neb. Press Ass 'n, 427 U.S. at 548.
A substantial portion of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion explains the need to
select an unbiased jury and sets forth the standards to be applied. See Burr, 25
F. Cas. at 50.
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witnessed a marked expansion of the media in covering criminal
trials. Almost ten years ago, I represented Susan McDougal in a
federal trial charging her with obstruction of justice and criminal
contempt for refusing to testify about the Clintons before a grand
jury. 14 At the time, the competition in the cable television arena was
just heating up. An upstart Fox News Channel and MSNBC were
vying to compete with CNN for viewership. I remember thinking
then that the coverage of the case could not be any more pervasive. I
was wrong. This competition, along with the advent of outlets such
as Court TV and hundreds of other cable channels and programming,
has led to more widespread and pervasive coverage of sensational
criminal trials,1 5 resulting in saturation coverage. Saturation
coverage provides up-to-the-minute reports of all aspects of the case,
from "live, exclusive" coverage of police executing search warrants,
made for TV perp walks, or even in some cases drive-bys in front of
crowds screaming for blood, to the analysis of inadmissible evidence
and pundits commenting on and predicting the turnout. In this way,
the media often try supersized cases long before those cases are tried
in the courtroom. I believe this is not the criminal justice system the
Framers envisioned when they mandated a presumption of
innocence, strict evidentiary requirements, and a high standard of
proof in all criminal trials.
The Framers constitutionally protected both the right to a fair
trial 16 and freedom of speech and of the press. 17 Although normally
these fundamental rights are compatible, intense media coverage of a
crime and of the accused can jeopardize the impartiality of the jury
and bring both of these significant rights into direct conflict.
1 8
14. See Stephen Labaton, Susan McDougal Indicted for Refusing to Answer
Grand Jury's Questions, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, May 5, 1998,
http://partners.nytimes.com/library/politics/050598whitewater-mcdougal.html.
15. See Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in
Criminal Cases of National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the
Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 39, 41 (1996) (explaining that "new
technologies have led to an explosion in coverage of the criminal justice
system"); Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an
Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 631, 635 (1991) (discussing the
proliferation of the mass media in the coverage of criminal trials).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. Krause, supra note 7, at 562.
December 2006] 1171
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1167
Because the Framers did not prioritize rights,' 9 the Constitution
creates a challenging tension when the exercise of one right threatens
to interfere or actually interferes with another. 20  Which should
prevail?
Courts trying to harmonize the constitutional mandates of free
press and fair trial must "balance the two interests, attempting to give
each its fullest force.",2 1 In doing so, however, courts cannot ignore
"the realities of a modem society in which there is instantaneous
dissemination of information" on a massive scale.22 When the
Framers wrote the First Amendment, the only means of mass
communication was the printing press.23  "[T]he notion that
inculpatory evidence against an accused in a local judicial
proceeding might be transmitted instantaneously across the country
in a way that might create mass hysteria and passion was beyond any
comprehension.
24
When confronted with the seemingly irreconcilable tension
between the First and Sixth Amendments, I have observed that the
usual response by the "First Amendment first in right" adherents is to
suggest that any pretrial contamination of the jury pool can be
remedied by a change of venue or through the jury voir dire process.
My experience has been, however, that these solutions are no longer
feasible in supersized cases. With the advent of 24-hour national
cable coverage and the relatively new phenomenon of "stealth
jurors, 25 it has become increasingly apparent that a more drastic
solution is necessary in these cases where the Sixth Amendment right
to a fair trial is under siege.
A free press is essential to any democratic system because it
spurs debate and helps make government institutions more
19. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) ("The authors
of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between First
Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the
other.").
20. See id. at 551.
21. Krause, supra note 7, at 563.
22. Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 15, at 88.
23. See U.S. Info. Agency, A Free Press, ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY, Feb.
1997, at 3, http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/itdhr/0297/ijde/ijdeO297.pdf
24. Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 15, at 88-89.
25. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 5, at 345.
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accountable. 26 More specifically, our system recognizes that media
scrutiny of judicial proceedings helps ensure fairness by keeping the
spotlight on the judicial system.27 However, when pretrial publicity
undermines an accused's right to a fair trial, "a decision must be
made as to whether our system of government is best served by
favoring publicity or sacrificing it.
' 28
This tension in the area of freedom of expression is currently
being played out in the Scooter Libby prosecution and the
investigation of Barry Bonds for steroid use. In both cases on
opposite coasts, prosecutors have successfully sought court orders
29imprisoning reporters for not revealing their sources. The
reasoning is that in certain instances, freedom of expression must
give way to other fundamental principles. 30  If the freedoms
associated with media coverage, in effect, destroy the protections
afforded by the judicial process, the criminal defendant loses the
26. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people."); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945) ("[A] free press is a condition of a free society."); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system.").
27. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) ("A
responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. ... The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.").
28. Mark R. Stabile, Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in a
Highly Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 GEO. L.J. 337, 337 (1990).
29. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141
(C.A.D.C. 2006); States Side with SF Chronicle Reporters on Protecting
Sources, YAHOO SPORTS, Dec. 11, 2006,
http://www.sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=ap-bonds-
steroids&prov=ap&type=lgns.
30. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (concluding that
the public interest in "[f]air and effective law enforcement" outweighed the
consequential burden on the press).
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benefit of our criminal justice system.
31
"Just as one does not have the freedom to falsely shout 'fire' in a
crowded theater, one should not have the right to proclaim 'guilty' in
the arena of public opinion, trampling the fair trial rights of the
accused in the ensuing stampede." 32  Indeed, courts have never
defined freedom of expression as an absolute right.33 Rather, the
Supreme Court has held that freedom of expression should be
restrained in some circumstances to protect a defendant's right to a
fair trial.34 In essence, under current jurisprudence there is a legal
basis for restraining the media, since "[w]hen the exercise of free
press rights actually tramples upon Sixth Amendment rights, the
former must... yield to the latter." 35  In other words, the press
should have no role in the determination of a defendant's guilt or
innocence.
The ultimate goal in resolving the tension between free press
and fair trial rights should be to minimize the effects of the
prejudicial publicity that surrounds a criminal trial without
unconstitutionally chilling that speech. But "[g]iven the
pervasiveness of modem communications and the difficulty of
effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of . . jurors," trial
courts must take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that-no
matter what-"the balance is never weighed against the accused.
3 6
31. See Stabile, supra note 28, at 340.
32. Id. at 339 (footnote omitted).
33. Id.; see, e.g., Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950)
("Although the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech, press or assembly, it has long been
established that those freedoms themselves are dependent upon the power of
constitutional government to survive.... Freedom of speech thus does not
comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time.").
34. Stabile, supra note 28, at 339-40 (citing Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S.
50, 53 (1951)).
35. Id. at 340 (quoting In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir.
1988); see also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946) ("In the
borderline instances where it is difficult to say upon which side the alleged
offense falls, we think the specific freedom of public comment should weigh
heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. Freedom of
discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential
requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice.").
36. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
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More specifically, courts must make sure that the presumption of
innocence is not, however subtly, turned into a presumption of guilt.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIA COVERAGE,
JURY BIAS, AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
American courts have long struggled to determine whether
exposure to pretrial publicity biases potential jurors.37 The 1807
treason trial of Aaron Burr is considered "the earliest and most often
quoted case" to specifically address this issue. 38 Because of the press
coverage of that sensational trial, Burr's attorneys made a motion to
disqualify citizens from the jury who were aware of the facts of the
case, even though they had formed no opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of Burr.39 In denying the motion, Chief Justice Marshall
explained that the impartial jury required by the common law, and
secured by the Constitution, need only be "composed of [jurors] who
will fairly hear the testimony which may be offered to them, and
bring in their verdict according to that testimony, and according to
the law arising on it.' '40 Thus, the mere fact that a juror had been
exposed to pretrial publicity was not dispositive of his ability to act
impartially. 4'
The standard regarding pretrial publicity and juror bias set by
the Court in Burr continues to guide trial courts today. Awareness of
the case and of certain facts does not automatically render a juror
unfit for jury service.42 Accordingly, since jurors can come into the
courtroom having been exposed to media coverage of the case, the
37. Minow & Cate, supra note 15, at 639.
38. Id. (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 201, 202 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(No. 14,694a)).
39. Id. (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(No. 14,692g)).
40. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692g).
41. See id. at 51-52.
42. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961) ("It is not
required.., that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues in-
volved .... To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to
the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the
presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an
impossible standard.").
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relationship between such media exposure and jury bias is crucial in
evaluating whether a defendant has been denied the right to a fair
trial.
A. The Media's Effect on Jury Bias
Sociological studies have linked pretrial publicity to the
likelihood of a biased jury.43 One such study found that the more
pretrial coverage a person is exposed to, the more likely that the
person will know about a given case, and that the more a person
knows about a given case, the greater the likelihood that the person
will form a biased opinion about the defendant.44 More significantly,
the study revealed that although other factors may play a role,a5
"pretrial publicity is the most serious cause of juror bias. ' 6 In light
of "strong and consistent" evidence that a clear nexus exists between
information level and a person's propensity to prejudge, the study
concluded that "indeed ... the best jurors are uninformed jurors. 4 7
For many decades now, those intimately involved in our legal
system have complained about the detrimental effect of media
exposure on the proper functioning of our jury system. a8 I can
43. Krause, supra note 7, at 560. But see Minow & Cate, supra note 15, at
663-64 (distinguishing between "impartial" jurors and "unaware" jurors and
concluding that jurors' exposure to media does not necessarily create an
inappropriate bias).
44. Krause, supra note 7, at 560 (citing Edmond Costantini & Joel King,
The Partial Juror: Correlates and Causes of Prejudgment, 15 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 9, 21-24 (1981)).
45. Id. Other factors include gender, education, social background,
demographic characteristics, and general attitudes toward crime and
punishment. Edmond Costantini & Joel King, The Partial Juror: Correlates
and Causes of Prejudgment, 15 LAW& SOC'Y REV. 9,36-37 (1981).
46. Krause, supra note 7, at 560.
47. Costantini & King, supra note 45, at 24.
48. See, e.g., Stuart H. Perry, The Courts, the Press, and the Public: An
Address Delivered Before the Michigan State Bar Association, 30 MICH. L.
REV. 228, 234 (1931) ("Trial by jury is rapidly being destroyed in America by
the manner in which the newspapers handle all sensational cases .... As the
law stands today there is no important criminal case where the newspapers are
not guilty of contempt of court day after day.") (quoting Clarence Darrow);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Not a
Term passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had in
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certainly relate. I have tried cases where material was excluded from
evidence because it was too prejudicial for the jury to hear, only to
have this same material broadcast and printed so often that jurors
later actually thought it was presented as evidence. In one such case
I was involved with, the appellate court reversed a conviction
because evidence made its way into the jury room that was never
presented in the courtroom but was pervasively discussed in the
media. I have also been involved in trials where jurors lied to get
seated on the jury either to convict my client or in expectation of
cashing a check in a book deal.
As a result of the vast expansion of the media in recent years,
the public today is given supposed insight and highly inflammatory
information about certain criminal trials "in finely-tuned detail. 49
The prejudicial effects of the press's heightened participation in the
criminal trial process are substantiated by the growing number of
appeals alleging deprivation of a fair trial "due to media-created juror
bias."
50
Although some observers argue that "the extraordinary
conditions necessary for media coverage to actually prejudice jurors
are so rare that the problem occurs only in a few exceptional
cases," 51 this conclusion---even assuming it is correct-nonetheless
does not "foreclose the need for adequate remedies." 52  As one
States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury
trial has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts ...
49. Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 15, at 41.
50. Id.; see also Minow & Cate, supra note 15, at 636 (explaining that in
the 1980s, the national newspapers and wire services alone carried over 3,100
of these claims); id. at 636-37 n.22 (explaining why this figure underestimates
the actual number of reports).
51. Krause, supra note 7, at 561 (citing Ralph Frasca, Estimating the
Occurrence of Trials Prejudiced by Press Coverage, 72 JUDICATURE 162
(1988)). "Despite widespread fears of prejudicial coverage, the conditions
necessary for media coverage to prejudice jurors to the extent that they are
unable to decide a case based on courtroom evidence are likely to occur in only
one of every 10,000 cases." Ralph Frasca, Estimating the Occurrence of Trials
Prejudiced by Press Coverage, 72 JUDICATURE 162, 162 (1988).
52. Krause, supra note 7, at 561 (citing Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative
View of Media-Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests
About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 16 (1989)
(explaining that although media-induced jury bias is infrequent, it is still a
December 2006] 1177
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commentator noted, "The problem is qualitative, rather than
quantitative: Even if the conflict between free press and fair trial
occurs only in a small number of cases, how we choose to deal with
those exceptional cases is what truly defines the fairness of our
judicial system.
' 53
B. High-Profile People and the Presumption of Innocence
"Justice principles" inform our most basic understanding of the
criminal justice system.54 Paramount among these is the maxim that
in all criminal trials, an accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty by the prosecution. 55  This principle is based upon a
controlling belief that "an individual's liberty interest outweighs the
government's interest in punishing criminals. ' '56 American
jurisprudence has long treated the presumption of innocence as a
constitutional guarantee with a significance and content of its own.
Though this doctrine requires all criminal defendants to be presumed
innocent until a prosecutor proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
extensive media coverage can render the presumption of innocence
meaningless.
I experienced this phenomenon firsthand during the Scott
Peterson capital murder trial, in which I represented Mr. Peterson.
Most potential jurors, even after being instructed on the law by Judge
DeLucchi, the presiding judge, admitted during jury selection that
they thought the accused was probably guilty, but that they looked
forward to hearing his side of things. This predisposition towards
problem worthy of attention)).
53. Id.
54. Damien P. DeLaney, Article, Better to Let Ten Guilty Men Live: The
Presumption of Life-A Principle to Govern Capital Sentencing, 14 CAP. DEF.
J. 283, 285 (2002).
55. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The
principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law."); Lilienthal's Tobacco v.
United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266 (1877) ("[I]n criminal trials the party accused
is entitled to the legal presumption in favor of innocence, which, in doubtful
cases, is always sufficient to turn the scale in his favor.").
56. DeLaney, supra note 54, at 285 (citing Scott E. Sundby, The
Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457,
458 (1989)).
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guilt inverted both the presumption of innocence and the burden of
proof in one fell swoop.
Of course, my experience has been that, in prosecutions where
the defendant was a celebrity before being accused of a crime, the
presumption of innocence may be able to withstand media onslaught
because the public-and hence the jurors-equate the defendant with
the character upon which he or she obtained celebrity. Fans view
their idols through the media prism by which they are known.
Therefore, the public's approval of and commitment to celebrities
can often balance out a barrage of negative publicity, leaving the
presumption of innocence intact. In contrast, most defendants in the
criminal justice system, including those who are infamous (as
opposed to famous), are vulnerable to a media-generated
presumption of guilt.
I have also observed that during jury voir dire in cases that do
not involve high-profile people, jurors often admit that they believe
in the old adage that where there is smoke, there is fire. This
predisposition towards guilt is even more pronounced where the
accused is despised and demonized by the media. When that
notoriety is combined with saturation coverage, the presumption of
innocence is reduced to a meaningless concept, merely mouthed. In
effect, the burden of proof is shifted to the accused.
IV. PRETRIAL PUBLICITY AND ITS EFFECT ON TRIAL FAIRNESS
A. Media Manipulation and Juror Taint
In my view, the media's reflexive invocation of the First
Amendment has, in effect, hijacked our criminal justice system.
Media producers follow and shadow jurors offering them
inducements. Media outlets go to court seeking access to autopsy
and coroner's photos and reports, purportedly in the name of the
"public interest." I have even seen TV show hosts start campaigns to
have jurors removed for "pro-defense" bias and actually publish
information as to their jobs, home addresses, and where their
children go to school. In many high-profile cases, the unrelenting
media saturation essentially preordains a verdict in the case.
Like the infamous gossip tabloids in England, the supermarket
tabloids in America will print virtually any rumor, negative
December 2006] 1179
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innuendo, or outright falsity. 57 Unfortunately in high-profile cases,
these stories jump rather quickly into the mainstream media. 58 In my
experience, the process develops as follows. Whereas most media
require at least two or three credible sources in order to report
content,59 tabloids like the National Enquirer do not have such a rule;
they will essentially print a rumor even if from an anonymous
source. Once a story gets published in the tabloids, different
journalists start discussing the story, and it soon jumps from the
National Enquirer onto cable networks such as Court TV or Fox
Cable News. Then the mainstream media pick up the story,
explaining that "published reports state . . ." or "according to sources
." Once legitimate mainstream media cover the story, morning
shows start commenting on it, and newspapers and magazines begin
printing it. The Internet further perpetuates this chain of reporting,
as websites and blogs continually publish unverified information by
anonymous sources, rendering such information accessible to
millions. Thus, a piece of information that may have started off as
no more than a whispered rumor by an unidentifiable source will
have morphed into an established "fact" spread by media outlets
around the country and the world.
Furthermore, unlike lawyers who are regulated by strict
professional codes and guidelines enforced by their state bars,6' the
press's code of ethics is voluntarily followed with no formal
enforcement mechanism. The press is not externally constrained.
Quite the opposite. For example, California has incorporated a broad
57. See Andie Tucher, Through the Grapevine, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv.,
July-Aug. 2000, at 66-67 (reviewing JEANNETTE WALLS, DISH: THE INSIDE
STORY ON THE WORLD OF GossiP (2000)), available at
http://archives.cjr.org/year/00/2/2/tucher.asp (describing common tabloid
tactics including the write-around, the anonymous source, the innuendo, and
the half-truth).
58. See, e.g., id. at 66 (noting that the O.J. Simpson case made "tabloid
values, tabloid techniques, and tabloid standards... become the values,
techniques, and standards accepted by the mainstream media").
59. See Lori Robertson, A Source of Embarrassment, AM. JOURNALISM
REV., Apr. 1997, at 11, 11, available at http://www.ajr.org/article-
printable.asp?id-2314 (explaining that the two source rule is standard
procedure at many newspapers).
60. See Tucher, supra note 57, at 66-67.
61. E.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-120 (2006).
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shield law into the California Constitution which provides that
members of the press may not be "adjudged in contempt by a
judicial, legislative, or administrative body.., for refusing to
disclose the source of any information procured while so connected
or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other
periodical publication." 62 With this added layer of protection of its
sources, there is little in the way of external constraints to deter the
media from relaying erroneous information to the public.
As the actual criminal proceedings begin, the media continues to
communicate the news to the public. Since there is a 24-hour news
cycle to fill, media outlets "report" a seemingly endless flow of
information. During trial, wire reporters cover the proceedings like a
sporting event. They discuss the case as if they observe minute-by-
minute action. The news story begins to take on the ESPN sports
model, where journalists report that the prosecution had a good day,
the defense is playing catch up, the witness took a beating, etc.
But a trial is nothing like a sporting event. In fact, a trial is
rarely even a consecutive series of events at all. Trial events may
make no sense at all unless viewed in the wider context of the trial
itself. Yet that is rarely done unless someone like Greta Van
Susteren-that is, a former practicing trial lawyer who on occasion
actually attends the proceedings-places the information in context.
Moreover, the reason an attorney does or does not do something
in court is often not apparent to the press. A lawyer, for instance,
will often ask a witness a question simply to set up that witness-or
some other witness-for a later question. But because the press fails
to realize this, it will often misrepresent the significance of the
colloquy.
While the media pretends to be simply an agent or surrogate of
the public, 63 news has ceased to be neutral because reporters have
ceased to simply report. Objective reporting has given way to a new
journalism-a subjective form of fact-telling known to participants
as "advocacy journalism"-which blurs the line between fact and
opinion. 64 It seems that this erosion in objectivity has led reporters
62. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
63. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-
73 (1980) (explaining why media claims that they are functioning as surrogates
for the public are validated).
64. See Sherry Ricchiardi, Over the Line?, AM. JOURNALISM REv., Sept.
December 2006] 1181
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1167
to take a position, to either praise or bash, because confrontation is
what sells. And I believe it is this subservience to commercial
objectives which has skewed the free press, fair trial calculus.
B. Protective Orders: Who Do They Really Protect?
Courts commonly use a protective order, also frequently called a
gag order, to, in theory, regulate the potential impact of media
coverage in a given case.65 Although courts originally designed gag
orders as a means to protect the defendant from unrelenting
prejudicial pretrial publicity, 66 they no longer effectively serve that
purpose. Instead of acting as a prophylactic shield protecting the
defendant, such orders have actually become a weapon in the
prosecution's arsenal. This is typically a result of the now obligatory
press conference that accompanies almost all charging
announcements by the prosecutor. The press conference is
stereotypically choreographed with a photo opportunity usually
emphasizing the most prejudicial evidence-which, in my
experience, is often inadmissible-accompanied by pronouncements
that "the crime has been solved" or "the public can rest easy
tonight," as a result of the arrest of some person. That "photo op"
becomes the B roll for endless loops of television coverage of the
case and, from that point forward, defines the public perception of
the defendant.
Ironically, it is usually soon after this press show that the
prosecutor races into court seeking a gag order against the defense in
order to protect the public from "undue prejudicial pretrial
publicity." In actuality, by that point, the request is just a
disingenuous way of muzzling the defense from responding to the
prosecution's poisoning of the well.67
1996, at 25, 27 (noting that "[a]dvocacy journalism lets reporters off the hook
by allowing them to fill gaps in knowledge with emotional opinion" (quoting
Bill Kovach)).
65. See Gabriel G. Gregg, ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule 5-120: A
Flawed Approach to the Problem of Trial Publicity, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1321,
1363-64 (1996).
66. See Jaime N. Morris, Note, The Anonymous Accused: Protecting
Defendants' Rights in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REv. 901, 906
n.44 (2003).
67. See, e.g., Matt Dozier, DA to Move for Gag Order in Trial, DAILY
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Furthermore, leaks often occur despite the gag order, largely due
to the very shield laws, discussed above, that protect journalists from
citing their sources. 68 In many cases the police leak inadmissible and
prejudicial information to the media.69 Prosecution witnesses who
are covered by the gag order are routinely offered the "services" of
lawyers who then parlay their "representation" into constant media
appearances pronouncing the guilt of the accused. 70  Thus, even
though the gag order's intent was to shut down the publicity, 7 1 as a
practical matter it ends up compounding misinformation and rumor.
I have experienced this anomaly firsthand.
C. Ethical Rules That Muzzle the Defense
Even in the absence of a gag order, certain ethical rules can
restrict attorneys from making extrajudicial statements that may be
prejudicial to a fair trial.72 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,73 the
Court considered whether Nevada's interpretation of a State Bar rule
governing lawyers' extrajudicial statements violated the First
NEXUS ONLINE, Apr. 29, 2005, http://www.dailynexus.com/news/2005/
9604.html. In the Jarrod Davidson homicide case, Public Defender James Egar
opposed the prosecution's motion for a gag order, explaining that "[t]he
prosecution has made inflammatory comments to the media, and now they are
trying to keep the defense from getting a fair chance to respond." Id.
68. See, e.g., D.A. Miffed by Leak of Laci Peterson Autopsy, NBC4, May
29, 2003, http://www.nbc4.tv/news/2235898/detail.html. After parts of an
autopsy report had been leaked to the media in the Scott Peterson double
murder case, Stanislaus County District Attorney James Brazelton commented:
"Evidence in this case should be presented in court through the testimony of
witnesses and not selectively leaked to the news media by unknown persons
whom the press will not identify." Id.
69. See, e.g., Mary Mostert, Do the Levys and the Media Owe Gary Condit
an Apology?, CONSERVATIVETRUTH.ORG, May 29, 2002, http://www
.conservativetruth.org/archives/marymostert/05-29-02.shtml (explaining that
the media "did a real hatchet job on Congressman Gary Condit, based entirely
on an unidentified leak from the.., police department").
70. See, e.g., The Scott Peterson Murder Trial: Gloria Allred, Amber
Frey's Attorney, Discusses the Case (Court TV television broadcast Sept. 24,
2004); On the Record with Greta Van Susteren: Scott Peterson's Ex-Girlfriend
Hires a New Lawyer (Fox News Channel television broadcast May 19, 2003).
71. See Morris, supra note 66, at 918-19.
72. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-120 (2006).
73. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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Amendment. 74 In balancing the First Amendment rights of attorneys
in pending cases and the State's legitimate interest in maintaining the
integrity and fairness of trials, a divided Court held that a state may
constitutionally restrict attorney speech upon a showing of
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to a fair trial.75
Nonetheless, the Court also held that the rule, as written, was void
for vagueness.
76
Several years later, following the media coverage of the double
murder trial of O.J. Simpson, California enacted Professional
Conduct Rule 5-120. 77 The Rule allows the State Bar to impose
disciplinary sanctions against attorneys who make extrajudicial
statements about cases in which they are involved.78 However, the
Rule provides a limited exception. 5-120(C) allows an attorney to
protect his client from the "substantial undue prejudicial effect of
recent publicity not initiated by the member or the member's client"
by authorizing a statement by the attorney "limited to such
information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse
publicity."7 9  Justice Kennedy had articulated the reasoning
underlying this exception in Gentile:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom
door. He or she cannot ignore the practical implications of
a legal proceeding for the client. Just as an attorney may
74. Id. at 1034.
75. Id. at 1075.
76. Id. at 1048.
77. Douglas E. Mirell, Gag Orders & Attorney Discipline Rules: Why Not
Base the Former upon the Latter?, 17 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 353, 357 (1997).
California State Senator (now Superior Court Judge for the County of San
Mateo) Quentin L. Kopp (I-San Francisco) introduced and later amended
Senate Bill 254 which became a directive requiring the State Bar of California
to submit to the California Supreme Court for its approval a rule of
professional conduct "governing trial publicity and extrajudicial statements
made by attorneys concerning adjudicative proceedings." Id. at 358 (quoting
S. 254, § 1 (Cal. 1994) as amended in Assembly on Aug. 16, 1994). Kopp
explained that the measure was inspired by "the staggering excesses of lawyers
and witnesses in the O.J. Simpson criminal case." Id. (citing Henry Weinstein,
Limits on Attorney Comments Loudly Opposed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at
A3).
78. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-120 (2006).
79. Id. R. 5-120(C).
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recommend a plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid the
adverse consequences of a possible loss after trial, so too an
attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's
reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of
indictment, especially in the face of a prosecution deemed
unjust or commenced with improper motives.
80
Thus, although gag orders and ethical rules ostensibly seek to
protect defendants from prejudicial publicity, they often achieve just
the opposite. Without the ability to seek comment from the lawyers,
the media ends up being reduced to nothing more than a conduit for
leaks, spins, and attacks, leading to misinformation and resulting in
irreparable jury taint. Hence, since the media is often used to drive a
prosecution theory and defense attorneys are gagged from
responding, the result is a skewed, one-sided version of the alleged
facts. All the while the public's opinion becomes set and in many
cases inflamed. It is against this backdrop that jurors are selected.
D. Pretrial Publicity and Jury Selection
"[E]ven in the absence of actual prejudice, pervasive pretrial
publicity can" severely taint the jury pool so as to deny the accused
the right to a fair trial.8' In Irvin v. Dowd,82 the Supreme Court, for
the first time, struck down a state conviction solely on the ground of
prejudicial pretrial publicity.83 About ninety percent of prospective
jurors that were examined on the point had "entertained some
opinion as to guilt-ranging in intensity from mere suspicion to
absolute certainty."8 4 In reversing the conviction, the Court noted
that "[w]here one's life is at stake-and accounting for the frailties
of human nature-we can only say that in the light of the
circumstances here the finding of impartiality does not meet
constitutional standards."
85
The impact of pretrial publicity was equally if not more
pervasive in the more recent Scott Peterson capital murder trial. A
80. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1043.
81. Alberto Bemabe-Riefkohl, Prior Restraints on the Media and the Right
to a Fair Trial: A Proposalfor a New Standard, 84 KY. L.J. 259, 278 (1996).
82. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
83. Morris, supra note 66, at 914.
84. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727.
85. Id. at 727-28.
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jury consultant for the defense in that case noted that this was by far
the highest prejudgment rate she had ever seen. 86  Due to the
spectacular amount of pretrial publicity surrounding the case, I
expected some juror taint. However, nobody could have imagined
the extent to which pretrial publicity had polluted the jury pool, and
in my opinion, effectively preordained a guilty verdict. Prospective
jurors came to jury selection not only with a presumption of Scott
Peterson's guilt, but actually convinced of it. From about 1,600 jury
questionnaires, one of the most notable was filled out by an illiterate
man. Although he could barely write his own name, he was able to
scratch out a single word on the 23-page form--"g-u-t-y." The other
questionnaires revealed equally committed convictions of guilt. Two
practicing Buddhists who opposed the death penalty were willing to
make an exception for Scott Peterson and three potential jurors
actually volunteered to pull the switch. It bears reemphasis that this
was all before one iota of evidence had been presented in a court of
law.
The danger of pretrial publicity is that it reaches inside the jury
box, whether as a singular impact such as a juror's intention to sell
his story in a lucrative book deal, or as the more benign yet
pernicious influence of community sentiment inflamed by the media.
In both cases, the impartial fact-finders envisioned and guaranteed by
the Constitution 87 have been replaced by biased advocates sitting in
the jury box.
V. THE LESS-THAN-ADEQUATE
JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
Courts recognize that pretrial publicity may be prejudicial to a
defendant.88 Accordingly, judges are equipped with an arsenal of
86. Diana Walsh, The Peterson Trial: The Art of High-Stakes Jury Picking:
2 Seasoned Consultants Compete in Courtroom, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2004, at
Al (quoting Jo-Ellan Dimitrius).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
88. See, e.g., Irvin, 366 U.S. at 729-30 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("How
can fallible men and women reach a disinterested verdict based exclusively on
what they heard in court when, before they entered the jury box, their minds
were saturated by press and radio for months preceding by matter designed to
establish the guilt of the accused."); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356
(1966) ("[E]very court that has considered this case, save the court that tried it,
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tools to help achieve impartiality in the courtroom. 89 The techniques
used to minimize the impact of bias include using the voir dire
process to exclude biased jurors, moving the trial to a venue not so
permeated with publicity, granting a continuance until the publicity
dies down, imposing a gag order on trial participants, sequestering
the jury to reduce their exposure to publicity, and admonishing the
jury to ignore publicity surrounding the trial. 90 However, these
remedies have proven to be demonstrably ineffective when there is a
high level of prejudice against the defendant.9' Even the two most
commonly used techniques, voir dire and change of venue, have
ceased to adequately guarantee that a fair and impartial jury will be
impaneled.
92
A. Ineffectiveness of Voir Dire
Judges prefer the voir dire process as a remedy for pretrial
publicity and the primary means through which to seat an impartial
jury.93 Although there is a lack of social science research on the
general effectiveness of voir dire, the research that exists suggests
that voir dire is ineffective as a means of identifying prejudice by
jurors. 94 A major criticism of this technique is that potential jurors
often offer inaccurate or dishonest responses. 95 Studies have shown
that not only do jurors often hide their true prejudices and
preconceptions during voir dire, but that jurors also sometimes lie
outright during open court questioning. I have actually had jurors
during voir dire admit, when confronted, that they, in fact, were not
honest in either trying to get on or off of a jury panel. I often seat
has deplored the manner in which the news media inflamed and prejudiced the
public.").
89. Morris, supra note 66, at 903; see also Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 555 (1976) (stating that the trial judge has a major responsibility to
mitigate the effects of pretrial publicity); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358-62
(delineating protective measures that the trial court could have taken to
minimize the prejudicial impact of the media).
90. Morris, supra note 66, at 903.
91. See Krause, supra note 7, at 563-69.
92. See Minow & Cate, supra note 15, at 654.
93. Id. at 649-50.
94. Id. at 650.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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jurors who admit to a bias, as opposed to those who, after hearing a
laundry list of heinous crimes that my client is accused of, claim to
have absolutely no reaction whatsoever.
Furthermore, as voir dire questioning progresses fewer jurors
admit to potential bias, suggesting that prospective "jurors learn from
their colleagues' [in court responses] the 'right' answers to the voir
dire questions." 97 Jurors that want to give the "right" answer are also
likely to desire approval from the judge and to be in the majority.
98
Such jurors hide their potential biases to pass the fair and impartial
juror test.99
High-profile trials also present the special challenge of weeding
out those jurors "who are 'auditioning' to be on the jury." ' These
jurors, known as "stealth jurors" in the legal community, are people
who dissemble their way onto the jury in a high-profile case for their
own self-serving reasons.'01
Given the extraordinary media attention that high-profile trials
attract, it is not surprising that people want to be part of these
cases. 10 2  In these highly publicized trials, "[t]he enticement of
possible celebrity status [or] monetary gain" is often the motive of
stealth jurors.10 3 Some jurors who have served in high-profile trials
have, in fact, "garnered momentary fame in the aftermath of the
97. Id. at 651.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Rachel Hartje, Comment, A Jury of Your Peers?: How Jury Consulting
May Actually Help Trial Lawyers Resolve Constitutional Limitations Imposed
on the Selection ofJuries, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 479, 499 (2005).
101. Id. at 499-500; see also Dan Abrams, Can 'Runaway Jury' Be Real?:
So-Called "Stealth Jurors" Could Be Sabotaging the Justice System,
MSNBC.coM, Apr. 2, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4653700/.
According to DecisionQuest, a jury consulting firm specializing in jury
research, trial consulting, and jury selection, 25% of 1,000 people surveyed
said they could envision a situation where they would want to serve on a jury.
Id. About 14% said they would be willing to hide information about
themselves to get on a jury. Id. From 163 lawyers surveyed, 60% believed
there are more stealth jurors, and 66% said this phenomenon has increased
over the past 5 years. Id.
102. Gershman, supra note 5, at 345.
103. Hartje, supra note 100, at 500.
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verdict."' 0 4 Others have capitalized on the experience through movie
or book deals, appearances or interviews on television, or even by
posing in Playboy magazine.
0 5
Sometimes, though, a stealth juror's goal is to get on the jury
strictly to convict the defendant. 10 6 During the Peterson trial, three
stealth jurors were removed from the jury venire. In each instance,
the defense received a tip about a specific juror who had a firmly
rooted desire to convict and "fry" Mr. Peterson before the
prosecution called the first witness. These three jurors were caught
from about 1,600 that were called for jury duty,' 07 and they were
unveiled only by happenstance. They had seemed sincere, honest,
and impartial during questioning, proving that even the most rigorous
voir dire is unable to weed out all stealth jurors. However, it should
come as no surprise that stealth jurors are capable of outsmarting a
method that decides impartiality on the "honor system."' 8 I believe
that other stealth jurors made it onto the Peterson jury, just as stealth
jurors have surely sat on juries in other high-profile trials.
Whether their goal is to affect the outcome of the case or to
make a profit from it, stealth jurors' presence on the jury manipulates
jury selection and undermines the integrity of the entire criminal
justice system. In as much as voir dire has its shortcomings in
detecting partiality among prospective jurors, the inadequacy of voir
dire in identifying prejudice is most explicitly demonstrated by the
phenomenon of stealth jurors.
B. Ineffectiveness of Change of Venue
If there has been extensive pretrial publicity and if remedial
104. Gershman, supra note 5, at 345; see also Joel Cohen, Celebrity Jurors,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 7, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.stroock.com/
SiteFiles/Pub264.pdf.
105. Hartje, supra note 100, at 500; see, e.g., Cohen, supra note 104, at 2;
Lisa Sweetingham, Peterson Jury Has Plenty of Troubled Role Models,
COURTTV.coM, Nov. 11, 2004, http://www.courttv.com/trials/peterson/
juror-mischiefctv.html.
106. Gershman, supra note 5, at 345.
107. See Louis Sahagun & Mark Arax, Peterson Found Guilty of Killing
Pregnant Wife, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2004, at Al.
108. See generally Minow & Cate, supra note 15, at 650 (stating that voir
dire fails to elicit accurate or honest responses from potential jurors and as
such is ill-suited as a means of identifying prejudice).
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measures have proven to be an inadequate method of ensuring a fair
trial in the venue where the crime occurred, the Supreme Court has
held that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a change of venue
to secure an impartial jury.'
09
But in high-profile cases that fascinate the public, "no county
escapes media coverage; publicity saturates the nation before the trial
begins."" 0 Furthermore, given the current state of electronic media
in which information is instantaneously transmitted nationwide,"'
the likelihood of finding unbiased jurors in an alternate venue is
diminished and sometimes impossible. In supersized trials with
widespread appeal, it is unrealistic to think that the adjoining county,
not to mention the entire state and perhaps even the whole country, is
any more immune to saturation coverage of the case than the place
where the crime occurred. Thus, the change of venue to an adjoining
county is increasingly of no consequence in terms of jury
selection.' 12
VI. USING CONTEMPT OF COURT
TO SECURE THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Given the detrimental impact modern media is having on
criminal trials in this country, and given the demonstrably ineffective
109. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) ("[I]t was a denial of
due process of law to refuse the request for a change of venue, after the people
of [the] Parish had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of
[the defendant] personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was
later to be charged); see also Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511 (1971)
(vacating defendant's conviction because he was denied his constitutionally
guaranteed opportunity to show that a change of venue was required in his case
due to massive media coverage).
110. Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 15, at 41-42.
111. See supra Part II.B.
112. Depending on the extent of the publicity, change of venue to a much
larger metropolitan county distant from the site of the crime may have the
effect of diluting the impact of prejudicial media reporting. See, e.g., People v.
Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 318 (Ct. App. 1976) ("A metropolitan setting with
its diverse population tends to blunt the penetrating effect of publicity."). But
see Lansdown v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 154, 157 (Ct. App. 1970)
("Population, qua population, is not alone determinative; it is but one factor
and it must be shown how size, whether of area or of population, neutralizes or
dilutes the impact of adverse publicity.").
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remedies available to courts, some other solution is necessary to
protect defendants' Sixth Amendment and due process rights in
supersized cases. Since there are currently no external restrictions or
deterrents imposed on the media," 3 "there is little incentive for the
press to refrain from sensationalist reporting." 114 A properly crafted
statute, however, would "effectively remove the media's incentive to
publish material that could endanger an accused's right to a fair and
impartial trial, while still allowing public debate to continue on the
important issues of the day."" 
5
A. English Common Law of Contempt
In order to fully understand our legal institutions today, it is
important to know how they developed and have come to be what
they are.' 16 Many aspects of American law have their roots in early
English common law." 17 The principle that courts possess inherent
contempt power is one such example." 8 The Supreme Court has
explained that the Constitution "cannot be interpreted safely except
by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they
were when the instrument was framed and adopted. ' 19 Accordingly,
it has held that "the English common law of contempt was adopted
by the United States upon [the] establishment of the United States
113. See supra Part IV.A.
114. Krause, supra note 7, at 574.
115. Id.
116. Harold J. Berman, The Western Legal Tradition in a Millennial
Perspective: Past and Future, 60 LA. L. REv. 739, 740 (2000); see generally
id. at 739-52 (discussing broad historical and philosophical underpinnings of
the Western legal tradition and explaining their importance in understanding
our legal institutions).
117. See id. at 740-41; see also Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610
(1914) (noting that "the provisions of the Constitution... are organic living
institutions transplanted from English soil").
118. See Fatema E. Fallahnejad Burkey, The Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, 30
May 2001, Judgment on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt:
A Critical Analysis of the ICTY Appeals Chamber's Abandonment of Witness
Protection Measures, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 300-01 (2004); William F.
Chinnock & Mark P. Painter, The Law of Contempt of Court in Ohio, 34 U.
TOL. L. REv. 309, 318 (2003) (describing the source of contempt authority as
the "inherent power of the court").
119. Chinnock & Painter, supra note 118, at 318 (quoting Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925)).
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Constitution. '120 Legislatures can supplement the inherent contempt
power of courts with specific contempt statutes, 12 1 as England has
done. 122
B. The Difference Between
the English and American Approaches to Free Press-Fair Trial
Although in the United States, virtually "nothing spoken outside
the courtroom is punishable as contempt,"' 12 3 in England the
importance of a fair trial wins out over free press as English
legislators have passed severe contempt of court laws for those who
report court proceedings. 
124
English courts have long recognized "the potential threat to
justice posed by unrestrained publicity,"'125 and people in England are
troubled by both the excessive media coverage of American trials
and by American laws that permit widespread publicity surrounding
these trials. 126 British criticism of the American judicial system is
valid in this regard. Leading criminal lawyers in England have
commented that high-profile trials in the United States demonstrate
that the American criminal justice system is in shambles.
127
Furthermore, one English supporter of the current laws in England
remarked that "[s]trict contempt of court rules are supposed to
prevent British justice [from] sliding into U.S.-style 'trial by media'
120. Id.
121. "[A]lthough some states have by statute or decision expressly
repudiated the power of judges to punish publications as contempts on a
finding of mere tendency to interfere with the orderly administration of justice
in a pending case, other states have sanctioned the exercise of such a power."
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 267 (1941).
122. See infra Part VI.C.
123. Stephen A. Metz, Justice Through the Eye of a Camera: Cameras in the
Courtrooms in the United States, Canada, England, and Scotland, 14 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 673, 686 (1996).
124. Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle
Ground, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 151 (1999); see also Joanne
Armstrong Brandwood, You Say "Fair Trial" and I Say "Free Press ": British
and American Approaches to Protecting Defendants' Rights in High Profile
Trials, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1412, 1430 (2000).
125. Brandwood, supra note 124, at 1431.
126. Id. at 1430-31.
127. See id. at 1413.
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where freedom of expression takes precedence even over the right to
a fair trial.' ' 8
C. Britain's Contempt of Court Act of 1981
Britain's Contempt of Court Act of 1981 was passed following
the sensational trial of Jeremy Thorpe, the former leader of the
English Liberal Party, who was accused, along with others, of
conspiracy to commit murder. 129 Until then, the courts had relied on
the common law doctrine of contempt of court, which allowed
English courts "to prevent or punish conduct which tends to obstruct,
prejudice or abuse the administration of justice."'130  Because the
enforcement of that law had been attacked as both arbitrary and
unduly harsh, the Contempt of Court Act of 1981 was enacted to
liberalize the common law of contempt.'31
The 1981 Act provides that the media will be strictly liable for
any publication or broadcast "addressed to the public at large...
which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the
proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced."'
132
However, strict liability only applies to "active" proceedings;
therefore, the Act applies only from the time a suspect is arrested, or
a warrant issued, until the proceedings conclude, whether by
acquittal, conviction, or administrative termination.'
1 33
Courts assessing whether there has been a violation of the Act
must consider when the piece was published, the likelihood that
jurors saw the piece, whether the piece affected the opinions of the
jurors, and the likelihood that jury members will be able to follow
directions aimed at neutralizing the prejudicial impact of the piece.' 
34
128. Grania Langdon-Down, Law: Trial by Media: Watching for Prejudice;
After the Geoff Knights Fiasco, Can We Trust the Press to Allow the Accused a
Fair Hearing? After OJ, Can We Trust the Jury?, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 11,
1995, at 12.
129. Eugene R. Sullivan, The Great Debate V: A Debate on Judicial Reform,
England v. United States, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 341 (2001).
130. Brandwood, supra note 124, at 1432 (quoting Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1979)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1433 (quoting Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c. 49, § 2(1)-(2)
(Eng.)).
133. Id. (citing Contempt of Court Act, c. 49, § 2(3), sched. 1).
134. Id. at 1434.
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Courts must then "determine whether the risk of prejudice from the
publication is both immediate and serious" and, if so, courts may
impose the appropriate sanctions.
1 35
Although the Act, on its face, may favor Sixth Amendment fair
trial rights over the current American understanding of free speech
guarantees, several defenses are available under certain
circumstances.' 36 For publications where the risk of prejudice is
only incidental to a broader discussion addressing issues beyond the
particular proceeding, a public interest defense is available. 3 7 The
Act also includes an innocent distribution defense that can be raised
if the distributor neither knew nor had reason to know that the
material was contemptuous.' 38 Moreover, it includes an innocent
publication defense that may be raised if the publisher neither knew
nor had reason to know that the proceedings were active when it
published the material. 39 Finally, a "fair and accurate report of legal
proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in
good faith" is an absolute defense to any contempt charge. 1
40
American commentators have begun to urge that similar
legislation be enacted in the United States to give trial judges the
discretion to use their contempt powers in appropriate cases."' As
one commentator noted,
Permitting judges to use common sense and a realistic view
of the impact of an unchecked media on judicial
proceedings may indeed be a more effective alternative than
merely relying on the current rigid First Amendment
standards which romanticize a media which, arguably, no
longer adequately fulfills its role as the promoter of an
135. Id. Under the statute, courts may impose fines and prison sentences for
fixed terms not to exceed two years. See Contempt of Court Act, c. 49, §
14(l)-(2).
136. Philip L. Judy, The First Amendment Watchdog Has a Flea Problem,
26 CAP. U. L. REv. 541, 590 (1997).
137. Id.; see Contempt of Court Act, c. 49, § 5.
138. Judy, supra note 136, at 590; see Contempt of Court Act, c. 49, § 3(2).
139. See Contempt of Court Act, c. 49, § 3(1).
140. Judy, supra note 136, at 590 (quoting Contempt of Court Act, c. 49, §
4(1)).
141. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 7, at 574; Judy, supra note 136, at 592.
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informed citizenry.
14 2
As far back as 1907, in Patterson v. Ex rel. Attorney General of
Colorado,143 the Supreme Court "explicitly endorsed a revitalized
contempt doctrine."' 44  There, Justice Holmes wrote that courts
retain "an inherent right to impose sanctions against outside
influences that 'would tend to obstruct the administration of justice'
during a pending trial."' 145 In the decades that followed, however,
this judicial power has been largely ignored in the context of the free
press versus fair trial debate.
Using Britain's Contempt of Court Act of 1981 as a model, both
Congress and state legislatures should enact legislation that mirrors
Britain's "commitment to impartial justice" and its "unwavering
support of fair trial rights."' 146 As one proponent of this idea has
urged, to do so would "place the responsibility of monitoring the
harmful consequences of pretrial publicity on those who can do
something about it: the members of the media .... ,,147 Until then,
the fair trial rights of criminal defendants-particularly those who
find themselves in supersized cases-will fall prey to the mass
media's sensationalism. This is hardly the function of a free press
envisioned by the Framers.
VII. CONCLUSION
High-profile cases and their increasing media coverage have
forced courts to confront the impact of prejudicial saturation
coverage on a defendant's fair trial rights. In an age of mass
communications, the conventional remedies used to minimize the
impact of juror bias no longer effectively protect the rights of
criminal defendants from the dangers posed by prejudicial publicity.
As other commentators have likewise concluded, when faced
142. Judy, supra note 136, at 592.
143. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
144. Judy, supra note 136, at 591. See Patterson, 205 U.S. at 463 ("[I]f a
court regards, as it may, a publication concerning a matter of law pending
before it, as tending toward such an interference, it may punish it as in the
instance put.").
145. Judy, supra note 136, at 591 (quoting Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462).
146. Brandwood, supra note 124, at 1451. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 7, at
570-73 (providing suggested elements of an "American Contempt Statute").
147. Krause, supra note 7, at 571.
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with escalating media coverage of these supersized trials, courts
cannot continue resting the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants-not to mention those defendants' liberty and, in some
cases, lives-on the current ineffective remedies used to identify and
"remedy" jury bias.1 48  Ultimately, the solution to this growing
problem may lie in importing the English "contempt" model for
dealing with irresponsible press coverage of active criminal
proceedings.
148. Minow & Cate, supra note 15, at 663.
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